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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GARRETT RANDOLPH BOWSER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44231
Kootenai County Case No.
CR-2015-14283

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Bowser failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either
by imposing a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, upon the jury’s verdict
finding him guilty of leaving the scene of an injury accident, or by denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence?

Bowser Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
On August 15, 2015, Bowser consumed alcohol and then drove “in an
unsafe/uncontrolled manner,” with his friend, Justin, in the passenger seat of the
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vehicle. (R., pp.15, 17; PSI, p.18. 1) Bowser swerved off the roadway and crashed into
a “mailbox post,” causing “an approximate 10 foot 2x12 board with numerous mailboxes
attached” to smash through the passenger side of the front windshield, which “struck
Justin in the head,” causing severe injuries. (R., pp.15-17.) Bowser fled the scene,
driving with the 10-foot rail of mailboxes still protruding from the windshield of his
vehicle, and subsequently left Justin – who was “only semi-conscious” – at Justin’s
brother’s residence, before again fleeing in the still-damaged vehicle. (R., pp.15-17.)
Bowser eventually “parked facing southbound in the northbound lane” of Gem road.
(R., p.15.) Witnesses observed Bowser “‘fall’ out of the driver’s position,” and noted that
he appeared to be intoxicated “based on his unsteady demeanor and the odor of an
alcoholic beverage about his person.” (R., pp.15-16.) Bowser then left his vehicle and
ran to the highway, where he “was picked up” by an unknown driver. (R., pp.16-17.)
Meanwhile, Justin’s brother rushed Justin to the hospital, where Justin was treated for a
concussion, internal injuries to his wrist, and severe lacerations to his face that required
sutures. (R., pp.16-17; PSI, p.3.) It was noted that Justin “was likely to be admitted to
[the] hospital due to his injuries.” (R., p.16.)
The state charged Bowser with leaving the scene of an injury accident and
striking a fixture. (R., pp.70-71.) The case proceeded to trial and a jury found Bowser
guilty of both counts. (R., p.174.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of five
years, with two years fixed, for leaving the scene of an injury accident, and a concurrent
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “BOWSER,
Garrett – 44231 - PSI.pdf.”
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180-day jail sentence for striking a fixture. (R., pp.182-85.) Bowser filed a notice of
appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.186-89.) He also filed a timely
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.19092; 209.)
Bowser asserts his sentence for leaving the scene of an injury accident is
excessive in light of his support from family and friends, purported regret, employment
at All City Construction, 60-day period of sobriety, and because his wife was pregnant.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire
length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160
Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d
217, 226 (2008).

It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the

defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. McIntosh, 160 Idaho
at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant must show
the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution. Id. “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” Id. (quoting Stevens, 146
Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
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prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the
trial court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for leaving the scene of an injury accident is five
years. I.C. § 18-8007(2). The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years,
with two years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.183-85.)
On appeal, Bowser contends, inter alia, that his sentence is excessive in light of his
support from family and friends and his ability to maintain employment. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.4-5.) However, Bowser had much of the same support before he committed
the instant offense, and it did not prevent him either from committing the instant offense
in August 2015, or from going on to commit the new crimes of DUI and possession of a
controlled substance in February 2016. (PSI, pp.9-11, 15, 35, 46, 48, 50.) Likewise,
Bowser’s employment did not preclude him from continued criminal offending. (PSI,
pp.4-9, 12.) It is also noteworthy that Bowser’s only long-term employment was working
“on and off” for his father at All City Construction and that his father had “fired” Bowser
several times throughout that period of time. (PSI, pp.12-13, 30.)
Although Bowser claims that he regrets that his friend was injured, he continues
to deny that he is responsible for committing the crime of which he was convicted. (PSI,
pp.4, 29.) Furthermore, Bowser’s claim of regret rings hollow in light of the fact that he
once again chose to endanger others by committing a new DUI (as well as a new crime
of possession of a controlled substance) while this case was pending.

(PSI, p.9.)

Bowser’s purported “commitment to sobriety” is likewise suspect, given that, after he
seriously injured his friend while committing the instant offense in August 2015, he
continued to use alcohol and marijuana for over six months – even after committing the
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new crimes of DUI and possession of a controlled substance in February 2016. (PSI,
pp.9, 13, 31.) Indeed, during his substance abuse evaluation, conducted on April 11,
2016, Bowser admitted he had used both alcohol and marijuana in the previous month,
and also stated that he had used marijuana 42 out of the 90 days preceding the
evaluation. (PSI, pp.29, 31-32.) He also failed to participate in any self-help group
meetings or substance abuse treatment programs during the nine months between his
commission of the instant offense and sentencing in this case, 2 and told both the
substance abuse evaluator and the presentence investigator that he “did not think
substance use treatment was needed.” (PSI, pp.14, 31-32.)
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable
to its decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Bowser’s sentence. (5/11/16
Tr., p.413, L.6 – p.414, L.15; p.416, L.9 – p.420, L.16.) The state submits that Bowser
has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the
attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its
argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)
Bowser next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. (Appellant’s brief, p.6.) If a sentence is
within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a
plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To
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Although Bowser claimed, at sentencing, that he “made contact with ACES” in order to
sign up for outpatient treatment, it is noteworthy that he did not seek treatment for
approximately eight months following his commission of the instant offense; instead, he
waited until just a few weeks before sentencing to do so. (5/11/16 Tr., p.410, Ls.10-13;
PSI, p.29.)
5

prevail on appeal, Bowser must “show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” Id. Bowser has failed to satisfy his burden.
Bowser argues that his sentence should have been reduced in light of his
placement in a work facility, intention to participate in programs, and because he had
been “staying out of trouble” for approximately two and one-half months since he had
been incarcerated. (Appellant’s brief, p.6.) None of this was “new” information that
showed he was entitled to a reduction of sentence. The district court was aware, at the
time of sentencing, that Bowser wished to obtain his GED; Bowser told the presentence
investigator that he had already “completed some courses but still needs to complete
the math portion.” (PSI, p.12.) Bowser also indicated, at sentencing, his willingness to
participate in rehabilitative programs. (5/11/16 Tr., p.410, Ls.8-17.) As such, Bowser’s
intention to participate in programs while incarcerated was not “new” information before
the district court. Bowser’s placement in a work facility is likewise not “new” information
that supports a reduction of sentence, as the placement of inmates lies within the
discretion of the Idaho Department of Correction, and the district court was aware, at
the time of sentencing, that Bowser’s risk to reoffend was in the low-moderate range,
which made it likely that Bowser would be placed in a lower security facility. (PSI,
pp.15, 43-44.)
With respect to Bowser’s claim that he was entitled to a reduction of sentence
because he had been “staying out of trouble” while incarcerated, acceptable behavior is
no less than what is expected of inmates committed to the Department of Correction.
Moreover, in State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773, 229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010), the Idaho
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Supreme Court held that where, as here, a defendant presented no other new
information in support of his Rule 35 motion, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in giving little or no weight to the defendant’s good behavior while in prison (a
trial court's denial of defendant's motion for reduction of sentence was not an abuse of
discretion; defendant's prison behavior did not provide valid grounds for a reduction in
sentence). Bowser’s short period of acceptable conduct while incarcerated does not
outweigh the seriousness of the offense, the danger he poses to the community, his
failure to be deterred from ongoing criminal behavior (even after committing the instant
offense), and his failure to rehabilitate despite having been afforded numerous prior
opportunities for treatment.
In this case, the district court noted that Bowser’s argument in support of his
request for sentence reduction “only addresses the rehabilitation aspect of sentencing.
…

Obviously, [in] this case protection of the public is – is a large factor as well.”

(7/29/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-15.)

“When a court reasonably determines that other

sentencing objectives outweigh the goal of rehabilitation, the court does not abuse its
discretion in denying a motion for leniency under Rule 35.” State v. Moore, 131 Idaho
814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998). In denying Bowser’s Rule 35 motion, the court
adhered to its belief that the objective of protection of society was the overriding factor
in this case. Clearly, Bowser’s behavior in the instant offense presented a great danger
to the community, and in fact caused serious harm to his passenger. His conduct
thereafter in committing a new DUI offense demonstrates that Bowser continues to
present a grave risk to society.

The state submits that by failing to establish his
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sentence was excessive as imposed, Bowser has also failed to establish that the district
court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Bowser’s conviction and
sentence and the district court’s order denying Bowser’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction
of sentence.

DATED this 2nd day of June, 2017.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of June, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

8

APPENDIX A

consider Is his employment. He is employed as a foreman
at All Oty Construction. That's something that shows
that he Is able to maintain employment aod that's
something he's been working at for a period of time and
s has a good sklll set In. That does point to his ability
6 to maintain In the community consistency and things
7 required to keep employment.
8
The next thing I would asl< the Court to
9 consider In fashioning this sentence Is his engagement
10 In treabnent. The GAIN recommends outpatient •• exaise
11 me, yeah, outpatient community-based treabnent at level
12 2.1. Garrett has made contact with ACES In order to
13 begin doing that recommendation. He signed up, I
14 believe, a little while ago and ts waiting to get that
IS BPA funding so he can engage In that treatment. And,
16 again, that Is a rommunlty·based treatment that Is
17 recommended.
18
While It's still fairly new, the PSI, and
19 speaking to Garrett, he's been able to maintain hls
20 sobriety slnoe February 26th, 2016. I think that puts
21 us at roughly a little short of 60 days at this point.
22 That's something that Garrett's re.ally proud of. It was
23 40 at the time ~ the PSI and I checked with him this
24 afternoon and that's something he's been able to
25 maintain.

I
2
3
4

The LSI·R comes back to low as moderate ·· or
low moderate, I guess, they're hedging their bets,
but •• and that also Indicates he's amenable to
community-based supeivlslon.
The thing that really stood out to me In
s
6 reading the PSI and Just knowing Garrett Is, while maybe
7 not a specific Toohill factor, Is his motivation to
8 change. And we can't sit here and change the history
9 that Garrett brings to the table here today, but what we
10 have that's different than the times he's been In court
11 before, Is his motivation to really change what's going
12 on In his life. This event OCOJrred back In August of
13 2015, It's certainly been a bumpy road up until falrfy
14 recently as to what was going on with Garrett.
15
What I can point to the Court what has changed
16 for Garrett Is that he Is expecting his first child. I
17 know the Court doesn't want to consider that as a facb:lr
18 for sentencing; for Garrett that is a big motivation to
19 change. The Court saw It In the letters that are
20 attached to the PSI, the statements made by Garrett In
21 the PSI. That's something that's very significant to
22 him. Something that really Impacts how he wants to move
23 forward In his future.
24
The thing that's not touched on In the PSI,
25 and I'm going to share with the Court, Is the loss of a
1
2
3
4
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friendship, too. Garrett was really good friends with
his passenger that got hurt. That's a relationship In a
very small community that Is very lmpactful.
You know, they •• while there's no animosity
necessarily, they're not friends. They don't hang out.
They're not spending the weekends together. They're not
ftshlng. They're not hunting. They're not doing those
things that's really Important, I think, in a small
community and something that was really Important to
Garrett. So there was a loss there as well.
He has credit for only one day In thls case,
your Honor. We are asking the Court to consider
probation, but we recognize there needs to be a sanction
for the conduct.
We're asking the Court to consider imposition
of some local Jail time. Actually, to satl$fy that
punitive aod deterrence factor that needs to be a
consideration for this Court. But when we look at the
rehabflltatlon and look at the rommunlty safety and we
look at •• consider the least restrictive means that
needs to be considered by the Court to address those
Toohill factors, we stlll believe that Garrett Is an
amenable candidate for probation. That sanction and
deterrence can be satisfied with local Incarceration and
that he can engage In rommunlty·based treatment as he
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signed up to do at ACES to address the underlying
alcohol •• thank you, your Honor.
Oh, and we don't object to the State's request
to keep restitution open for a reasonable period of
time.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Bowser, the Court having accepred the
Jury's verdict that you were guilty of the offenses of
leaving the scene of an Injury accident, a felony, and
also the striking of a fixture, a misdemeanor. It's the
Judgment of the Court that you are guilty of those
offenses. The Court has four factors of sentencing In
mind that has to be considered In each case and I
consider them In your case. And the first of those
factors Is how to best protect society with a sentence
that's given.
Another factor I have to think about Is what
will deter you from criminal ronduct? What will
ronvlnce you to change your lifestyle based on a
sentence that's given. Also, what would deter another
person who Is In a slmllar situation of yours from
rommlttfng new offenses.
So I Just don't have to take Into
ronsfderatlon your circumstances, I have to think about
other people that are plllng •• complllng records like
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this one and what might change their behavior If they
were aware of this sentence.
A third factor Is what addresses the
punishment that society expects under all these
circumstances.
And then lastly, but an Important one, Is how
to help any rehab!Utatlon that can be aided by a
sentence. And I do have those factors In mind.
I do give you aedlt for the one day that you
served of Incarceration leading up to today's
sentencing.
You know what I've never heard from you In
this case Is what were you doing when you drove back to
Mr. Odeklrk's brother's house and t11ed to yank that
post out of the windshield and then left,
Where were you going? What were you doing?
THE DEFENDANT: I was going to my father's
house.
THE COURT: Why were you going to your
father's house?
THE DEFENDANT: Because that's where I was
living at the time and nobody·· I don't know. I was
just •• there was a million things that was going
through my mind at the time and, you know, don't get me
wrong, you know, the first thing that went through my
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mind when we got •• when we got In the accident was to
get him help, to get him help. And I got him to his
brother's house and that whole situation there was
cr<W{. But I knew Justin was going to get help because
his brother was taking him to the hospital. I mean,
there's not •• I don't know there's any other thing I
posslbly could have done. And •• yeah, and then I was
headed to my dad's house from thefe and then my vehlde
broke down.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: And I just - you know, don't
get me wrong, I wanted to get him help. But, yeah, then
there's the other part where It's, llke, now I don't
want to get In trouble, you know what I mean. There's a
million things that were going through my mind at the
time, but I did everything I could do to get him help.
THE COURT: All right.
THE DEFENDANT: I mean, this Is my best
friend. I wasn't going to leave him. I would have
never left him. Even If he wasn't my best friend, but
he was my best friend. I did not leave him.
THE COURT: Well, and I can understand that.
I can understand what you're saying ••
THE DEFENDANT: Maybe·· sorry. Sorry for
Interrupting.
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THE COURT: It's all right. Go ahead.
THE DEFENDANT: But maybe there's a mllllon
other things I could have done at the time, but nobody
knows what you're going to do until you're In that
situation and THE COURT: AH right.
THE DEFENDANT: I don't know. I feel terrible
that everything happened the way It did.
THE COURT: Well, I an acx:ept that
explanation. And there's some thoughts about that that
ru express here In Just a moment.
The record •• the almlnal history has got to
be taken Into oonsideration here. And It goes back ••
It started at age 18, just your adult a1mlnal history,
you get a DUI charge In 2004 and It got reduced down to
an Inattentive driving. And a lot of times maybe
there's not much evidence or a lot (I times It's
because, Well, he's a young man, let's give him a break.
Let's not saddle him with a DUI, let's give him an
rnattentlve driving.
There was also a battety Involved In that.
There was a minor In possession of alcohol because you
were only 18.
In the same year you get another minor In
possession of alcohol.
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In 2005, you get a resisting arrest and a
minor In possession of alcohol. So there's dearly some
significant aloohol Issues going on here with crlmlnal
offenses even before you're 19 years old.
By age 19 there's another misdemeanor aiding
and a misdemeanor, I don't really know what that Is.
By 21 there's this open container oonviction.
The same year there's some reckless driving.
Now, we have problems with alcohol and some
problems with driving are really starting to be part of
this pattern. That's reduced to an Inattentive drMng
In Shoshone County.
So you've had some breaks already now. You've
missed a DUI. You've missed a reckless conviction.
Those are real breaks for you.
In the same year you get "Encouraging a
juvenile to come within the purview of the juvenile
justice" I can't remember that exactly. Usually that's
you're with a minor that's drinking. That's usually
what that means.
So at age 22 you get a burglary charge In
Benewah County. That's reduced to a petit theft. You
get another break.
Now you've missed a DUI. You've missed a
reddess driving. You've missed a burglary. But what I
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don't see, Mr. Bowser, Is I don't see any change In
behavior. You're getting all these breaks and the
behavior doesn't change because In the same year you get
another petlt theft conviction. So now we're looking at
you're drinking a lot, you're driving badly, endangering
people, and you're stealing things.
2009 In Seattle you get a burglary charge and
conviction. so ·· It looks like. I don't know If It
was a misdemeanor or not. It's a misdemeanor burglary
In Washington. You only do 30 days, but behavior hasn't
changed.
By age 23 you get the felony possession of
marijuana that you end up being on probation on.
Behavior doesn't change. You're using drugs While on
probation and off to the penltentlary you go after a
rider. After a rider and then probatlon.
2013 In Kootenai County you get a grand theft:
charge. That's reduced to a petit theft:. SO you miss
another felony and you get a break and some time In the
county jail. Your behavior doesn't change.
You get a DUI conviction In the same year. Ari
unlawful entry oonvlctlon In the same year.
And then the •• this case In August of 2015.
One would think that this case would be just
the absolute end of the road. I mean, this Is such a
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bizarre case with your fr1end pinned In the car with
that pole smashed up against him and mailboxes are
hanging out of your windshield and the Injury that he
had and blood all over the plaoe. One would think that
If there was ever the rock bottom this Is It. But
apparently It's not It because you get a new DUI and a
new controlled substance conviction In Benewah C.ounty
even after this.
You still owe Benewah C.ounty a couple thousand
dollars, $2,500, In past fines and fees, so you haven't
paid up on your financial obligations. And I Just don't
see any change In behavior here.
Probation Is designed to help rehabllltatlon.
Rehabllltatton has come and gone now. You've had many,
many, many, many chances to get this changed around.
You're almost 30 years old and there's been no change at
all.
I hear you say that now you're ready for
change and I hope that's the case. I want that to be
the case. But that doesn't mean you're going to get
probation at all. It's just absolutely not In the cards
for you on this one.
So the Issue really comes down to the PSI
recommends a retained jurisdiction. Retained
jurisdictions are often engaged in to both help a person
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get some treatment and some rehabllltatlve services, but
to also kind of monitor how Is that person going to do
on probatl0n7 How might they do? You've already
demonstrated how you do on probatlon; you use drugs, you
get DUls. You've already given me the demonstration of
how you do on probation.
Again, It makes no sense to the Court to send
you down on a rider to find out how you might do on
probation; you've already answered that question with
your past behavlorS.
So with that, I'm going to impose a prison
sentence In this case. The sentence Is going to be a
five-year unified sentence; two years fixed followed by
three years Indeterminate. The credit for the one day
served. rm not retaining jurisdiction. rm not
suspending that sentence.
On the striking a fixture senl'ence, it will be
180 days of Jail, credit for one day served. That's
concurrent. So you'll be done with that In the first
fe:.v months of your pr1son term.
The Department of Transportation Is likely to
suspend your driver's license for one year. That's up
to them. n1 give the State 90 days to file either a
notlce of hearing on a restitution request or a
stipulation for restitution.
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Any questions from the State?
MS. GARDNER: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Ally questions from the defense?
MS. CHESEBRO: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: You're remanded to the bailiff to
begin the service of this sentence then. With that
you're exo.ised. You're remanded to the ballilf and we
are adjourned.
(C.ourt adjourned.)
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